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PARALLEL ETHICS, GUILTY ENCOUNTERS:
ISLAMIC MODESTY IN HUNGARY
"v
1. Introduction
Since 1989, Europe has been debating, legislating and protesting about Mus-
lim signs and claims of modesty. The question of modesty became a subject of
public debate as some Muslims, who, in the name of modesty, refuse mixing in
swimming pools, demand exonerating Muslim pupils from handshaking with
teachers, claim the Headscarf, Burqa, Burkini, etc. Additionally, other claims of
modesty concern bioethics as some Muslim women are required to be checked
only by female doctors, or refuse to breastfeed their babies in public places, etc.
Even more, as modesty became a matter of public discussion and, therefore of
exhibition (ex. veiled Muslim women's pictures on media and the marketization
of Islamic modesty, Shirazi 2016:144—174), a paradox of its own took shape, rais-
ing several questions, either by way of objection or scholarly investigation.
Many Europeans perceive such insistence on modesty as attempts to display
parallel ethics, centred on the guilt of the female body and sex segregation, which
not only was abandoned by European societies, but considered to be harmful for
gender equality, social mixture and cohesion. Some non-Muslims might even feel
guilty because Muslim modesty accuses them of being immoral, nude, or immod-
est. A seemingly embarrassing situation for many, Muslims and non-Muslims,
occurs when each leaves its comfortable ethical norms to meet the others. Often,
parallel ethics provide a solution to avoid conflict. Yet, most of the time, parallel
ethics produce reactions of rejection and mistrust. As people try to live together
in Europe, despite their differences, parallel ethics is another field to investigate
properly.
This paper argues that behind the claims of Islamic modesty in European
societies there lies an Islamic moral management whereby the outward matters
as much as the inward in embodying ethics. Islamic ethics require a Muslim to
be distinct, and in order to be distinct, one has to oppose or evolve in parallel
with another ethos, that of immodesty, perceived in relation to a given society.
Distinctiveness also requires visibility and, by implication, the modest person
is also the one who exhibits signs of modesty. Islamic ethical discourses see no
sense in private modesty. This could seem like another paradox: how could mod-
esty be ,,ostentatoire", to use the famous French word (French law banned the
headscarf in 2004 as being ostentatious)? If the exhibition of modesty is relational
to immodesty, and as European societies get more relaxed with the body, sex
and gender, Islamic modesty might, on the contrary, increase in moral anxiety in
Europe. In the last thirty years, Islamic modesty was re-appropriated in the face
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of "western" modernization, and many Muslims feel oppressed morally by an
immodest modernity. As an Islamic traditionalist scholar puts it, Muslims today
have the right to modesty, haqq al-haya' ('Afifi: 1987).
The idea of this paper is to provide first a broader view on modesty and its
ethical rules in normative Islam, and put these ethical questions in the context
of the links of religion with society. This contextualization of Islamic ethical
discourses explains how the traditional Sunni Hungarian Muslim community
appropriates the Islamic norms. Afterward, I will describe and analyse how the
discourse and the practice of modesty are perceived by Muslims in the Hungarian
context. Although in a few instances I look at modesty as a general character of
men and women, and in some examples I specifically touch on Islamic discourses
on male modesty, the focus of my study is female modesty. Male modesty con-
cerns other aspects such as beards, males wearing jewelry, and male sports
clothes in many games such as wrestling, gymnastics and swimming, which is
beyond the scope of our study (Krawietz 2014: 445-458).
2. Approaches to Muslim Modesty in Anthropology
A study by Asifa Siraj among Muslims in Scotland shows that conservative and
liberal Muslims hold remarkably similar views on the importance of female mod-
esty (Siraj 2011: 716-731). Moreover, it highlights the need for Muslim moral
agents for distinctiveness and visibility:
For all these women, wearing the hijab was motivated by religion.
It visibly marked them as Muslim women in a non-Muslim envi-
ronment: The first day that I wore it... I was thinking 'oh my God',
everyone was looking at me. But now when I go out to take the bins
out, I can't actually go without my hijab. It feels as though it is part
of me. I want to show everyone that I am a Muslim (Fariha, 22 years old)
(Siraj 2011: 724).
Following Abu-Lughod, one can identify four paradigms when addressing the
issue of modesty in Muslim societies (Abu-Lughod 2009). The first paradigm
argues that modesty is a system of meaning. It consists of respectful behavior and
sexual correctness, as a part of a code of honor of kinship which expresses the
social status of the family and embodies the moral ideals of men and women
(Abu-Lughod 1986). A second paradigm, functionalism, perceives in modesty a
way to preserve the patrilineal kin group. For this purpose, it excludes women
from interfering in decision-making over property and marriage alliances and
"outcastes" marginal socially groups (Meneley 1996). Obviously, Lughod's
approach is to a great extent functionalist as well. A third approach that could be
labeled internalized modesty maintains that the ideals and discourses of modesty
are experienced, learned, or cultivated by women themselves. The assertion of
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modesty as a moral ideal and the feelings of shame or embarrassment that women
experience in situations when they find themselves inappropriately dressed (Hos-
sain 2013). That is to say, internalized modesty provides a system of meaning for
the "modest" women. A fourth paradigm, that of piety as a vehicle of politics,
Islam understands modesty to be integral to the modern realisation of "closeness
to God" following the new wave of piety promoted by political Islam (Mahmood
2001:202-236).
Some anthropologists contest the use of the concept of modesty to describe
the moral code underlying Muslim practices in contemporary Islam. For instance,
Fadwa El Guindi, in her Veil: Modesty, Privacy, and Resistance, argues that
the modesty-based code - modesty-shame-seclusion - represents
an ethnocentric imposition on Arabo-Islamic culture. It makes more
sense in Christian Mediterranean societies and, without shame, the
Hindu-based societies of south Asia. This cluster of concepts is in-
accurately ethnocentric; but, more importantly, it obscures the nu-
anced difference that is characteristic of Arabo-Islamic culture. The
"modesty-honor" gendered opposition is equally inappropriate
(El Guindi 1999: 83).
El Guindi suggests sanctity-reserve-respect to read this moral code rather than
modesty-shame-seclusion, with evidence, primarily from Islamic law, relying
especially on the notion of hurma (Krawietz: 1991), which she renders as sanctity,
and which he claims to be close to the notion of privacy (El Guindi 1999: 85). She
contends that "the quality of hurma (which centers womanhood and home in the
culture) embodies a pervasive complex of values that identifies primary social
and religious spheres as sanctuaries - sacred and inviolable" (El Guindi 1999: 88).
The whole argument of El Guindi is based on a denial of the physiological
dimension of Islamic moral discourse on women. That is to say, she does not
find in the Muslim moral tradition any evidence that considers a woman's body
to be shameful. The evidence that contradicts her claim is legion. Suffice it here
to mention moral discourses on the women's voices. In Quran 31:32, it is stated
that "Wives of the Prophet, you are not as other women. If you are godfearing, be
not abject in your speech, so that he in whose heart is sickness may be lustful; but
speak honourable words" (Arberry's translation). Another instance is the widely
spread legal Islamic tradition "The voice of the woman is a nudity" (al-Ahmad
2008: 22), which also became central to Islamic popular cultures to the point that
most popular cultures in Muslim countries blame women if they raise their
voice, and speak out in the presence of men. Moreover, Islamic law disapproves
of women's call to prayer as this entails that women should raise their voices, and
they are not allowed to do that" (al-Ahmad 2008:25). One can also mention here a
tradition that concerns the five daily prayers, and which asserts that "Whoever is
alarmed by anything whilst praying, let men say 'Subhan-Allaah' and let women
clap" (al-Ahmad 2008: 27). This means that men can communicate through their
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voices while women cannot: and should clap. In Hajj and ,,Umrah, a place of
sanctity, a woman should praise God with a voice that she only can hear, while
men praise loudly" (al-Ahmad 2008:28-30).
Forbidding women's voices in religion is contested although it is still a dom-
inating narrative. Dorothea Schulz studied the radio-mediated interventions
of female group leaders and examined their critics "who articulate the Muslim
scholarly opinion that women should not be allowed to preach in public because
of the seductiveness of their voices and somewhat condescendingly refer to the
female leaders as 'radio hadjas' and challenge them on two grounds: their lack of
modesty and their lack of religious knowledge" (Schulz2012: 24).1
Whether modesty is a system of meaning, a social tool of a patriarchal order,
a lived experience of being fully Muslim or a politically pious act, a key issue
in the expression of Muslim modesty today is the necessity for these agents to
always compare Islamic modesty to non-Muslim immodesty and the necessity
to be seen and appear as modest. The aim of this paper is to explore distinc-
tiveness in Muslim ethics as parallel ethics. I suggest considering distinctive-
ness as another angle of approach to modesty.2 This approach takes seriously
into account both the normative discourse about modesty, to which refers the
moral agents as a system of meaning, and the function of such distinctiveness
in a given moral order. As a matter of fact, distinctiveness implies duality as the
moral agent is concerned about what to show and what to hide, the visible and
the invisible, the one and the other. Concern for modesty might lead to anxiety
and obsession with immodesty.
3. Parallel ethics: Rules of Islamic modesty
Since its foundational texts, the Qur'an and the Sunna, Muslim ethics have made
modesty an essential value. For example, the Quran 24:30-31 states that "Say to
the believers, that they cast down their eyes and guard their private parts; that is
purer for them. God is aware of the things they work. And say to the believing
women, that they cast down their eyes' and guard their private parts, and reveal
not their adornment save such as is outward" (Arberry's translation). Moreover,
the Quran 33: 59 states: "O Prophet, say to thy wives and daughters and the
believing women, that they draw their veils close to them; so it is likelier they
will be known, and not hurt. God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate". (Arberry's
translation). One can notice at least two motives in the Quranic discourse on mod-
esty: that modesty is related to shame, as the Quranic discourse requires women
1 See also on female modesty in reciting the Quran, singing and speaking on the phone, in: Damir-
Geilsdorf & Tramontini (2015). Currently, Rahina Muazu is writing a promising PhD dissertation on
The Recited Qur'an and Vocal Nudity: Contestations over the Female Voice in the Nigerian Public Space at
Berlin Graduate School Muslim Cultures and Societies, http://www.bgsmcs.fu-berlin.de/en/people/
students/students_2014/muazu-rahina.html (2017.01.22.).
2 Remotely, I am indebted to Pierre Bourdieu's distinction theory. See Bourdieu 1979.
209
Abdessamad BELHAJ
and men to cast down their eyes and guard their private parts. On the other hand,
modesty is associated with believing men and women.
According to the prophetic tradition, modesty, haya' is a part of faith; by
implication, those without faith, lack modesty, because a person who does
not believe in God commits the first act of immodesty, as they are expected
to show modesty, first and foremost, in front of God, by believing in him. The
tradition states that "the Prophet passed by a man who berating his brother
about his modesty to the point where he told him: I will beat you. The Prophet
said: Let him be. Modesty is part of faith" (al-BukharI2009: 602). Muhammad
is described in the Islamic tradition as modest as a virgin. One tradition states
that ,,the Prophet was more modest than a virgin behind her curtain; and when
he saw anything that displeased him, we saw the marks of it in his blessed face,
although he would not speak of it from modesty" (al-Tibrlz! 1810: 672). Another
tradition affirms that "Every religion has a distinctive virtue, and the distinctive
virtue of Islam is modesty" (Ibn al-Baghandi 1977:178). In another tradition, the
Prophet was reported to have said: "There are five conducts that distinguish the
Prophets-shame, patience, taking cupping, cleansing feet and using perfume"
(al-Ghazali 1993:137).
Modesty is not only a distinctive religious sign, but also a visible public sign so
much so that one can see modesty on the face of the modest person; one tradition
says that "whoever has modesty, it is his ornament" (al-Tibrizi 1810: 430). In the
same vein, Abu Hamid al-Ghazall (d. 1111) ascribed the following tradition to
the Prophet: "The Prophet said: There is no sin in back-biting a person who has
shaken off the screen of shame from his face" (al-Ghazali 1993:137). Another tra-
dition ascribed to the Salih Ibn 'Abd al-Quddus (late 8th century), a Muslim theo-
logian, ascetic and poet (executed for heresy) said: "When tears diminish, mod-
esty also. And there is no good in a face whose tears diminish" (al-Muhammad
2013: 8). In Muslim ethics, a woman's "haya' (shame, modesty) is considered her
beauty (zma) and a means in protecting men and society from committing sin"
(Kaivanara 2016: 72).
Therefore, the normative discourse insists equally on adopting a modest
behavior than on warning against the immodest one. The list of the latter is, by the
nature of things, longer. It includes: exhibition of sins, consumption of cigarettes,
and forbidden things in the public, stubbornness, insults, excess of polemics and
dispute, ingratitude towards parents, lack of politeness towards educators and
teachers, the nuisance towards neighbors, and people in general, to sing publicly,
to squeeze the tires of his car, rude and unpleasant jokes, exhibitionism, nudity
and debauchery, unveil the veil, mixing with men in shopping malls, moral or
sexual harassment, the imitation of the depraved habits of the unbelievers, want-
ing too much attention or envy, to speak too much about oneself, shouting in
shopping malls, the vulgar writings on the walls, etc. (al-Hamad 2013: 18-20).
Such a list corresponds to social practices, seen as immodest, in a conservative
society, the Saudi one. In a different context, as we will see later, the list of immod-
est practices would be certainly different.
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Normative Islam also requires the Muslim to exhibit modesty; that is to say,
not only one has to avoid the aforementioned signs of immodesty, but also has to
make sure through ethical action that no immodesty is visible and strive to make
modesty inhabit the moral space. In order to make modesty public, one should
frequent modest people and get away from coarse characters, enjoin and advise
one another on modesty, propagate an atmosphere of modesty within society,
educate children to be modest, make disappear scrupulously what is contrary to
modesty (al-Hamad 2013: 21).
Consequently, modesty is not a universal value, ethically speaking, to be
applied in all times and spaces. Modesty does not apply, for example, to learn-
ing, commanding right and forbidding wrong. A person should pursue religious
knowledge in particular without any consideration for modesty. Nobody should
shy away neither from applying Islamic law and ethics in the public, ruling justly,
or testifying in the courts, etc. (Ibn al-Baghandi 1977:178). The criteria of making
some areas exonerated from modesty is that any obligation by Islamic law should
be respected, independently from any ethical consideration.
In addition to the previous traditional Sunni sources on modesty, we shall
have a look now at Abu Hamid al-GhazalT's Ihya' 'ulurn al-dm's say on modesty, a
source that is considered to be the sum of ethical teachings in Islam from a main-
stream Sunni Islam point of view, mixing both Sufi as well as traditionalist ele-
ments. Al-Ghazali uses the term haya' for modesty, as it is the standard religious
word for it. However, Fazl-ul-Karim, the translator of the work into English, ren-
ders haya' as shame. In the third volume of the work al-Ghazall states that:
To feel shame is also a matter of sorrow and is good. The Prophet
said: Shame is a part of faith. He said: Shame does not bring but
good, he said: God loves the shameful and patient. 'He who commits
sin and does not feel shame to disclose it, brings his own ruin. Shame
is a conduct which begets good conduct (al-Ghazali 1993: 239).
Al-Ghazali draws attention here to the guilt apect of modesty, very much related
to his Sufi ethics. He also reiterates the need to conceal sin, and to protect the pub-
lic space from immodesty. Another element in his teaching is the moral economy
of modesty: the latter is good andgenerates God's love and goodness endlessly,
while immodesty generates ruin.
With regard to clothing, al-Ghazali held the opinion of the majority of tradi-
tional scholars which is to encourage women to stay at home, and if they go out,
they should be veiled, including the face. Al-Ghazali states that:
Nowadays, it is permissible for a chaste woman to go out with the
permission of her husband; however, remaining [at home] is safer.
'She should not go out except for an important purpose; going out
for the sake of looking [about] and for unimportant matters de-
tracts from virtue and may lead to corruption. If she goes out, she
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must avoid looking at men. We are not saying that the man's face is
shameful for her to look at as is the woman's face for him. Rather, it
is for her like the face of the beardless boy which a man should be
prevented from seeing when sight may result in evil; when evil is not
likely to result, sight should not be prevented. For men throughout
the ages have had unveiled faces while women go out veiled; if their
faces were shameful for women to look at, men would have been
commanded to be veiled or prevented from going out except for a
necessary purpose' (al-Ghazall 1984:101).
Thus far we have examined a Salafi source (al-Hamad), a classical source (al-Ghazall)
and now we shall examine al-Mawsu'a al-fiqhiyya, the Encyclopedia of Islamic Law, a
contemporary traditional source which represents the mainstream position among
Sunni jurists and theologians today. The Encyclopedia of Islamic law stipulates that
modesty, haya' governs different ethical situations: a person who intends to com-
mit a sin, a victim of an attack, a person asked by a beggar, or a person expected to
speak out in a council. In all these situations, a person should control him/herself,
and refrain from the bad and enjoin the good according to modesty. Some situ-
ations are legalistic, that is to say, they are governed by Islamic law: if a thing is
forbidden, refraining from it is obligatory, and if a thing is abominable, modesty is
recommended. If a matter is obligatory, modesty is forbidden (al-Mawsu'a al-fiqhi-
yya 1990: 262). The Encyclopedia of Islamic Law goes further stating that no modesty
should be displayed in confronting the unjust people and the sinful ones, which
should be reprimanded; equally, no modesty should be respected when it comes
to enjoining the good, and forbidding the wrong (al-Mawsu'a al-ficjhiyya 1990:263).
This is quite summative and leaves room for interpreting the scope of sin, the good
and the bad. Finally, this Encyclopedia mentions a concrete situation; if a person
invited himself to some meal and sat with them, and then they invited him to eat
out of modesty (embarrassment rather?), it is not permitted for him to eat this food
(al-Mawsu'a al-fiqhiyya 1990: 263). It can be seen here that Islamic law attempts to
remedy some limitations of modesty-based ethics. Insisting on manifesting mod-
esty everywhere, makes the whole social ethic care about harmony and appear-
ance, which some social actors exploit as an opportunity to use it for their benefit.
This could be called an appeal to modesty.
4. Islamic Modesty for Hungarian Muslims
The Magyarorszdgi Muszlimok Egyhdza (MME) is the chief organisation of Muslims in
Hungary, and operates the main website on Islam in Hungarian: http://iszlam.com/.
One evident particularity of its discourse on modesty is the immediate engage-
ment with modesty requirements for both men and women, which is often absent
in Arabic speaking discourses on modesty, which focus on the modesty of women.
This could be seen as an egalitarian stance on the issue of gender.
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According to the MME, man's modesty requires the male's body parts, between
the navel and the knees, to be covered. A man cannot dress in tight, transparent or
provocative clothing. That a man should cover these parts corresponds to the require-
ments of the practice of prayer in Islam. This is a minimal conception of modesty.
This style of dressing refers to Western society whose men are perceived to dress
immodestly, exhibiting their bodies. As for women, it maintains that "the Islamic
head scarf is a symbol of modesty, which aims to protect women. The Islamic phi-
losophy is always better to choose the safe way than to regret later. The Qur'an gives
a lot of attention to protect physically women".3 However, it does not specify the type
of headscarf that is required, whether integral or not, leaving the impression that the
organisation does not require the face and the hands to be covered.
It is evident here that the MME endorses, mainly, a "body-to-be-covered" per-
ception of modesty. In other words, there are parts which cause moral shame
and should be covered. It confirms the idea of visibility as a sign of modesty,
and in the case of women, this becomes more transparent. It claims the semiotics
of the headscarf as a symbol of modesty (meaning as a visible sign of modesty).
It also recalls the protective function of the headscarf, against aggressive men.
It implies that without the headscarf women are left unsafe. The physical protec-
tion of women (and not modesty itself as a value) becomes the ultimate meaning
of the headscarf.
The other Islamic organisation in Hungary, the Magyar Iszldm Kozosseg,
released a document in Hungarian on women's modesty which argues as follows:
Suppose you have two sisters who are twins, they are both equally
beautiful. Strolling down the street, one of them is dressed accord-
ing to Islamic veil, so only her face and hands to the wrists appears.
The other twin girl wears Western clothes, a mini skirt or shorts. In
one corner, there is a hooligan or ruffian who is waiting to pass at a
girl. Who will be the victim? The veiled or non-veiled girl? Of course,
the one wearing miniskirts or shorts will make a pass at her. These
clothes are an indirect invitation to the opposite sex, and let him
know that you can start with me. The Qur'an rightly argued that the
veil protects women from being upset.4
In addition to its dintinctive function as a visible sign of modesty, the headscarf
seems to be a protector against the ills of the Western civilisation. It might be said
that the headscarf stands at the center of a a clash of parallel ethics: detabooisation
of the body in modernity, a process that has continued in significant dimensions
in the last fifty years, and retabooisation by Islamic ethics.
3 The clothing of Muslims: http://iszlam.com/hittan/tisztasag-az-iszlamban/item/1589-a-muszlim-
oltozkodese (2017.03.29.)
4 "Hidzsab a nok szamara" (Hijab for women) the handout of a lecture given by one of the members
of the community in the mosque.
213
Abdessamad BELHAJ
5. Muslim women as true Hungarian women
The MME claims that Muslim women are similar to Hungarian traditional
women. It tries to build a case for Islam as fitting Hungary, while at the same time
condemns the current Hungarian society. Hungarian Muslims therefore seem to
be the most truthful to true Hungary, as they keep the best of it, incarnated in
Islamic ethics. The website puts it as follows:
Modesty is still part of our daily lives. The images can show in to-
day's Muslim women how traditional Hungarian women used to
dress: that the ladies are veiled wrist-length top line, and full-length
clothing covering their feet. The folk women tied their headscarf to
the back for their daily work, but when they went to church, they
covered their necks as well.5
Figure 1-2.: The heading says "Some examples of how Hungarian women used
to dress, not so long ago, and how they dress even today in some areas".
Source: (Magyarorszdgi Muszlimok Egyhdza, http://iszlam.com )
Nehany pflda arra, hojjyan sltoztek a magyar n<5k meg nem is olyan tigers,
i Helve hogyan oltoznek meg ma is egyes videkeken.
5 Muslim women and Hungarian traditional costume: http://iszlam.com/az-imakrol-l-resz-kerdezz-
felelek-eszrevetelek/68 (2017.03.29.)
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II
' T V a
Here, the idea of ethical parallel is of the utmost importance. One can observe
three sets of ethical parallels: Current Hungarian Muslims live in parallel with the
current Hungarian society as they have opposing ethical standards. Hungarians
today also live in parallel to past true Hungarians. Hungarian Muslims exist as
well in parallel with past true Hungarians as the latter were not Muslims and lived
in the past. Hungarian Muslims are new while at the same time true to the past.
One major difference between Hungarian Muslims and past Hungarians is dis-
tinction. Traditional Hungarian women were not distinguished by their clothes:
they wore what women used to wear according to the ethical standards of the
time and the space they lived in. Hungarian Muslim women wear clothes that
distinguished them from everything in their Hungarian context.
Behind the idea of distinction and comparison, even with a remote paral-
lel, there probably lies a guilty encounter with the current Hungarian society.
Distinctiveness if not rewarded might make the moral agent feel marginalized.
Certain agents might choose to assume marginality, and turn it into a distinc-
tive trait to be used as a social or economic resource. Other agents can hardly
cope with the status of marginality. Hungarian Muslims being a tiny minority,
until now, unable to turn marginality into a local economic or social resource,
might need to de-culpabilise their distinctiveness by appealing to the Hungar-
ian past (usually valued by current Hungarians), as Muslims, they appeal to two
"backwards": that of the Hungarian backward (when women are imagined to be
more modest) and of that the Muslim tradition (where the norms are imagined
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to be perfect), they hope to meet the right norms of modesty. In fact, by reversing
evolution, this moral discourse admits its own paradox, that its ethical standards
come from an opposing time and space to that of their society.
Then, visibility becomes both a resource and an obstacle. Without visibility no
distinctiveness can be achieved, and nobody would see or notice you. A Hungarian
Muslim woman, E. perfectly expressed this paradox of parallel ethics, distinctive-
ness and visibility:
I have been happy to dress this way because I realize that this is hap-
pening in my own interest, since so - even here, even in the Western
culture - experiencing more esteem and respect, I do not give any
man a reason to have bad ideas about me. My dress diverts atten-
tion from my body to the inside of me, in my mind. It makes me feel
feminine, while I also send a message with it: "this is a private area.
It only belongs to me and God. (And of course my husband ...)"6
Islamic modesty creates two parallel moral spaces: a conciliatory moral space
that benefits a woman (values her, distinguishes her) and assures her self-
esteem and respect (as an individual in a modern society where subjectivity and
moral self matter). E. seems to be emancipated when she describes this moral
space. The second moral space is conflictual (marginalizes her), as Islamic mod-
esty assumes that a man has, by nature, bad ideas about women who do not
dress according to Islam, and that man is a predator (associated with Western
society today). E. wants others to see her soul and not her body (body devalu-
ing). Under the pressure of this second moral space, E. becomes resilient and
submits in order to return to conciliation, but this time, in a traditional moral
system: authority over her body is not only individual, but shared with God and
her husband.
Muslim discourses on ethics often mobilize the notion of man's inherent
nature as a predator. In particular, Muslim theologians and intellectuals use the
metaphor of men as wolves (al-dhi'ab al-bashariyya): hijab (headscarf) then is seen
as victim as well as a rampart against the wolves, dhi'ab. A book entitled Adillat
al-hijab, the Proofs of the Headscarf illustrates this argument. It states that "every rea-
sonable person knows that a woman without headscarf, displaying her beauty,
is seen as a sign of insolence, impudence and cheap reputation. Then she would
be more likely to be depreciated for her low behaviour showing her beauty as a
good to be sold, and then she brings to her self the avidity of the human wolves"
(al-Muqaddam 2007: 452).
Another author, 'AH al-Tantawi, a major Syrian jurist, judge, man of letters
and theologian of the Muslim Brotherhood goes further. In his widely popular
text Ya ibnati (Oh My Daughter), al-Tantawi warns his daughter as follows "had
you known that men are all wolves and you are but a sheep, then you would have
6 Clothing and morals: http://iszlam.com/blog-bejegyzesek/item/489-oltozkodes-es-erkolcsok
(2017.03.29.)
216
Parallel Ethics, Guilty Encounters: Islamic Modesty in Hungary
fled from the wolf as a sheep uses to flee from the wolf.. .the wolf only wants meat
from a sheep, while the man wants from you something more precious than meat
is for a sheep, and worse than death for her, he wants from you the most valuable
thing in you: your chastity... the life of a dishonored women is worse a hundred
times than death for a sheep devoured by a wolf (al-TantawI 1985:13).
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to assess how Muslim Hungarians have recourse
to Islamic modesty and to morally distinguish themselves. One of the most sig-
nificant findings to emerge from this study is that moral distinctiveness could
be both a resource and a limitation for a moral agent. While it could offer social
capital as parallel ethics, protesting and defying the moral and social orders, the
risk for marginality limits considerably this moral gain. The social guilt of being
marginal pushes the moral agents to reconciliation: either through looking for
a moral ground with local agents (Hungarian Muslim women who dress like
traditional Hungarian women) or through submission to the Islamic patriarchal
order.
As one Muslim woman told me: "my religion and my scarf are parts of my
secret garden. Having never wanted to proselytize during my student and profes-
sional career, I saw myself doing it in spite of myself because my scarf is visible. It
is not the fault of my headscarf but that of society that has excluded it". The head-
scarf allows women to feel difference, value and pride, while on the other hand, it
excludes them. While being a visible sign of religious modesty, it is still obsessed
with immodesty, as it covers what it sees as immodesty and therefore judges mor-
ally women with no headscarf. Other limitations include forbidding the headscarf
in public schools, as in the case of France, and as many companies do. This in
turn creates parallel education (the creation of Islamic schools to respond to the
demand by veiled female students, and the creation of Islamic business to offer
job opportunities for veiled women).
As a social category, distinctiveness encompasses the four anthropological
paradigms of explaining Islamic modesty today (modesty as a system of mean-
ing, a social tool of a patriarchal order, a lived experience of being fully Muslim
or a politically pious act), demonstrating how meaning, patriarchal order, expe-
rience, and political piety are aspects of an individual and/or collective moral
economy. Meaning, function and experience evolve and change in accordance to
the benefit or harm a moral agent could draw from a given moral action.
This study has shown that distinction serves social functions: Covering pagan-
ism is a disruption within the social order, condemning the other as immodest.
It has also confirmed that visibility stands at the center of modesty, as the latter
should be enjoined in public while immodesty should be reprimanded. Control-
ling the outer apearance is no less important to Islamic modesty than controlling
the inner characteristics. Control does not entail losing any benefit as modesty
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protects women and increases their value. Despites some signs of individualiza-
tion and internalization of Muslim modesty, the latter is still largely a social mat-
ter in which individuals and societies have a moral responsibility to invest and
establish parallel ethics.
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